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CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1103:
FURTHER ABUSE OF THE RAPE VICTIM
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Dean Wigmore, "[n]o question of evidence has been
more controverted" 1 than the admissibility at trial of a rape victim's pre-
vious sexual conduct. The controversy entails important political as well
as legal considerations.
Reputation and opinion evidence of a rape victim's previous sexual
conduct, used in a rape case to prove consent, is arguably irrelevant and
prejudicial in a society where neighbors are often strangers and premari-
tal or nonmarital sex is commonly accepted. However, because such evi-
dence is frequently deemed admissible, women are discouraged from
pursuing complaints after being raped because of their fear of harassment
on the witness stand. The fears of victims in this regard are not un-
founded. Because they are permitted by rules of evidence to do so, de-
fense attorneys dwell on reputation and opinion testimony filled with
rumors of the victims' sexual lives. Thus, the focus of the judicial pro-
ceedings shifts, placing the victims rather than the defendants on trial.
Adoption in California of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which severely limits the defense counsel's inquiry into the vic-
tim's past sexual conduct, could potentially alleviate these problems.
Over the last few decades, state legislatures gradually have begun to re-
spond to the growing fears of women and to the criticisms of the laws
relating to the crime of rape. Perhaps it is now time for California to
make such a response.
This Comment evaluates section 1103 of the California Evidence
Code (CEC) and Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). The
author concludes that California should adopt the substantive provisions
of Rule 412 regarding methods of proving consent in rape cases.
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In preparing a consent defense in a rape trial, a defense attorney
often focuses upon the victim's prior sexual conduct to suggest her will-
ingness to consent on the specific occasion in question. Such a defense is
usually introduced through circumstantial evidence,2 as opposed to di-
1. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 200, at 682 (3d ed. 1940).
2. "The circumstantial use of character involves not only the establishment of the rele-
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rect evidence,3 of the character of the rape victim.
There are three possible methods of proving an individual's relevant
character traits: (1) reputation evidence, (2) opinion evidence, and
(3) evidence of specific instances of conduct. Reputation evidence is "ev-
idence of the subject's community reputation for possessing the character
trait in question."4 Opinion evidence is "testimony by a witness who is
familiar with the person in question and who can state his opinion
whether the subject has a certain character trait."5 Specific instances of
conduct refer to specific prior acts of the individual in question.
A. Section 1103 of the CEC
Section 1103 of the CEC is also known as the Robbins Rape Evi-
dence Law. According to its provisions, all three types of evidence (re-
ferred to above) may be offered to prove the victim's character trait for
consenting to sexual activity with the defendant as circumstantial evi-
dence in a rape case.6 It can be inferred from section 1103 that the use of
these three types of testimony is limited to evidence of conduct between
the victim and the particular defendant in question.7
Section 1101(a) of the CEC8 reveals the California Legislature's sus-
picion and disfavor of the use of character evidence. As a general rule,
section 1101(a) states the basic presumption in California that character
evidence is inadmissible as proof that a person acted in conformity with
vant character trait, but also the inference that the conduct in question was consistent with the
actor's character." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 105 (1978).
3. Direct use of character evidence occurs when the particular character trait in question
is an essential element in the case, and that occurs rarely in criminal cases. LILLY, supra note
2, at 102 n.5.
4. Id. at 102.
5. Id.
6. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1985). These provisions are limited to
two circumstances: (1) when the defendant offers it to prove conduct of the victim in conform-
ity with such character and/or (2) when the prosecution offers it to rebut evidence revealed by
the defendant in the first circumstance. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1985).
7. Section 1103(b) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, and except as
provided in this subdivision, in any prosecution under Section 261 or 264.1 of the
Penal Code. . .or for assault with intent to commit, attempt to commit, or conspir-
acy to commit a crime defined in any such section. . . opinion evidence, reputation
evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness'sexual conduct,
or any of such evidence, is not admissible by the defendant in order to prove consent by
the complaining witness.
(b) Paragraph (a) (of this subdivision) shall not be applicable to evidence of the
complaining witness' sexual conduct with the defendant.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
8. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966).
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that character on a specified occasion.9 The California Legislature recog-
nizes the need for this general presumption because of the inherent unre-
liability of character evidence. The authors of section 1101 state their
rationale for prohibiting the use of character evidence in civil cases in the
following manner:
First, character evidence is of slight probative value and may be
very prejudicial.
Second, character evidence tends to distract the trier of fact
from the main question of what actually happened on the par-
ticular occasion and permits the trier of fact to reward the good
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters.
Third, introduction of character evidence may result in confu-
sion of issues and require extended collateral inquiry.1"
Section 1101's legislative history indicates an awareness by the Cali-
fornia legislature of the danger of possible prejudice to the individual and
of confusion to the jury when character evidence "is offered as a basis for
an inference that [a person] behaved in conformity with that character on
a particular occasion."" This is a statutory recognition that it is unfair
to permit a proponent of evidence to imply that evidence of an individ-
ual's past sexual conduct justifies an inference of similar conduct on the
occasion in question.12
Despite the California Legislature's reluctance to allow the use of
character evidence and its explanation of why such evidence should be
inadmissible, it has abandoned this fundamental protection in the crucial,
sensitive area of rape. In safeguarding the rule precluding the use of
character evidence, the legislature has permitted only two exceptions.
Ironically, one of these limited exceptions to the general presumption
that such evidence is inherently unreliable and prejudicial involves its
admissibility in rape cases, in which introduction of such evidence is not
only unreliable and prejudicial, but extremely traumatic for the rape vic-
tim and irrelevant given today's society. In contrast, the FRE restrict
9. Section 1101(a) of the CEC provides in pertinent part: "[E]vidence of a person's char-
acter or a trait of his character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or
evidence of specific instances of his conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct
on a specified occasion."
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 Law Revision Commission comment (West 1983) (emphasis
in original).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. To permit the inference would be to ignore a basic principle of our democratic society
that people are innocent until proven guilty.
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the admissibility of character evidence in rape cases by limiting the meth-
ods of proving consent.
B. Rule 412 of the FRE
Rule 412 of the FRE was enacted as the Privacy Protection for
Rape Victims Act of 1978.13 The provisions of Rule 412 are limited to
crimes of rape and assault with intent to rape.
14
Rule 412 prohibits the introduction of reputation and/or opinion
evidence concerning the rape victim's past sexual behavior. 5 However,
it permits evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual con-
duct in these prescribed circumstances: (1) when the evidence is "consti-
tutionally required to be admitted;" (2) when the accused offers evidence
of sexual behavior between the victim and a third party to show whether
the accused "was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the
source of semen or injury;" or (3) when the accused introduces evidence
of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior with the accused relevant to
the issue of consent.
1 6
III. LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND RULE 412
Traditionally, defense counsel has been permitted to interrogate the
victim and to introduce evidence of her reputation in the community re-
garding her prior sexual activity. This practice is a clear reflection of a
deeply rooted societal assumption that such information is relevant to
proving the innocence of guilt of the accused. 7
13. Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978); FED. R. EvID. 412.
14. FED. R. EVID. 412(a) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a
criminal case in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape,
reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or
assault is not admissible."
15. Id.
16. FED. R. EVID. 412(b) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is
accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of a victim's past
sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-
(1) . . . constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) . . . evidence of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to
the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(3) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon
the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with
respect to which rape or assault is alleged.
FED. R. EvID. 412(b) (emphasis added).
17. The following is California's former standard jury charge on chastity in rape cases
which is an example of this traditional community belief:
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Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, the House sponsor of Rule 412,
emphasized that "[t]oo often in this country victims of rape are humili-
ated and harassed when they report and prosecute the rape. Bullied and
cross-examined about their prior sexual experiences, many find the trial
almost as degrading as the rape itself."18 She added that "rape trials be-
come inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's
innocence or guilt. . . . It is estimated that as few as one in ten rapes is
ever reported."' 19
The effect of Rule 412 is a sharp limitation on admissible character
evidence to discredit the victim in a federal rape trial. The rule excludes
all reputation and opinion testimony regarding a rape victim's prior sex-
ual conduct. However, it allows evidence of the victim's specific prior
sexual acts in specified circumstances.20
It is interesting to compare the provisions of Rule 412 with those of
the federal rules which formerly governed the admission of character evi-
dence at rape trials. Under the previous method for admission of charac-
ter evidence under Rules 40421 and 40522 of the FRE, reputation and/or
opinion testimony was admissible to show the victim's propensity to
consent.
Rule 404 provided for the admission of evidence of a victim's perti-
nent character trait to prove that she acted in conformity with it on the
particular occasion in question. Rule 405 permitted the character trait to
be proved by means of reputation and opinion evidence. Because the
new Rule 412 prohibits the use of such evidence, it improves in this re-
gard the protection accorded rape victims in federal court.
Rule 412 marks an attempt to circumvent constitutional problems
surrounding rape evidence as well as to encourage rape shield legisla-
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it may be
inferred that a woman who has previously consented to sexual intercourse would be
more likely to consent again. Such evidence may be considered by you only for such
bearing as it may have on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to the
alleged sexual act and in judging her credibility.
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 15 n.96 (1977) (emphasis added).
18. FED. R. EvID. 412 congressional discussion.
19. Id. See also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. FED. R. EVID 404(a)(2) provides that "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same" is
admissible.
22. FED. R. EvID. 405(a) provides in pertinent part that "[in all cases in which evidence
of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion."
1985]
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tion.2 3 Although it affects only a small number of cases due to the limita-
tions on federal jurisdiction,24 Rule 412 is intended to serve as a model
for those states without rape shield legislation. Representative Holtzman
advocated the passage of Rule 412 "to suggest to the remaining states
that reform of existing rape laws is important to the equity of our crimi-
nal justice system."'25 Senator Joseph R. Biden supported her views. He
noted that "[tihis bill will modernize the Federal Rules and at the same
time serve as a model for reform in the remaining states."
26
IV. PROBATIVE VALUE VERSUS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
A. Procedure
Rule 412 requires the fulfillment of several procedural steps in order
to introduce evidence of specific instances of an alleged rape victim's
prior sexual conduct with the defendant." At a pretrial hearing, if the
court determines that the evidence is probative enough to outweigh the
danger of unfair prejudice, it may be admitted at trial. However, it must
be admitted in accordance with a court order specifying the evidence that
may be offered and the scope with respect to which the alleged victim
23. FED. R. EVID. 412 congressional discussion.
24. Federal jurisdiction extends to rape cases where the alleged offense occurred within the
areas of maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or on an Indian reservation.
See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Nez, 661 F.2d
1203 (10th Cir. 1981).
25. FED. R. EVID. 412 congressional discussion.
26. Id.
27. FED. R. EVID. 412 provides in pertinent part:
(c)(1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to commit
rape intends to offer. . . evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past
sexual behavior, the accused shall make a written motion to offer such evidence not
later than fifteen days before the date on which the trial in which such evidence is to
be offered is scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to be
made at a later date, including during trial, if the court determines either that the
evidence is newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier through the
exercise of due diligence or that the issue to which such evidence relates has newly
arisen in the case. Any motion made under this paragraph shall be served on all
other parties and on the alleged victim.
(2) The motion. . . shall be accompanied by a written offer of proof. If the
court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence described in subdivision
(b), the court shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is
admissible. At such hearing the parties may call witnesses, including the alleged
victim, and offer relevant evidence....
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing. . . that the evidence
which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible
in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may be
offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-
examined.
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may be examined, or cross-examined.2" California has a similar
procedure.29
The issue of consent is of the utmost importance in a rape trial. It is
interesting to note that evidence of the complainant's general character
or reputation for unchastity is admissible on the issue of her consent in a
majority of jurisdictions.3 ° Yet, "the character of the defendant becomes
an evidentiary matter only when he chooses to place it in issue. "31
The trial becomes a credibility contest between the victim and the
defendant when the victim claims that she was raped and the defendant
claims that it was consensual. "[T]he defense has an added advantage in
that details of the woman's sexual history may be brought to the atten-
tion of the court while the man's sexual and criminal history oftentimes
is never questioned."' 32  "For many rape victims, the legal procedures
following rape may further threaten the woman's emotional state. It has
been said that there are, in fact, two rapes for the woman who reports the
28. The balancing procedure and requisite court order are not applicable to evidence
"constitutionally required to be admitted." FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
29. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1985) provides for the procedure for the admis-
sibility of evidence of sexual conduct of a complainant:
(a) In [a rape prosecution], if evidence of sexual conduct of the complaining witness
is offered to attack the credibility of the complaining witness under Section 780, the
following procedure shall be followed:
(1) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court and prosecu-
tor stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of
the sexual conduct of the complaining witness proposed to be presented and its
relevancy in attacking the credibility of the complaining witness.
(2) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the offer
of proof shall be stated.
(3) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order a
hearing out of the presence of the jury, if any, and at such hearing allow the
questioning of the complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the
defendant.
(4) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence proposed
to be offered by the defendant regarding the sexual conduct of the complaining
witness is relevant pursuant to Section 780, and is not inadmissible pursuant to
Section 352 of this code, the court may make an order stating what evidence
may be introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to be per-
mitted. The defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the
court.
(b) As used in this section, "complaining witness" means the alleged victim of the
crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this section.
30. L. SCHULTZ, RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 183 (1975). See also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d
224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968) (attorney's failure to investigate character of
complainant in rape case constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
31. L. SCHULTZ, supra note 30, at 186 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469
(1948). "The rule, then, firmly and universally established in policy and tradition, is that the
prosecution may not initially attack the defendant's character." I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 57, at 456 (3d ed. 1940).
32. C. GOLDSTEIN, THE DILEMMA OF THE RAPE VICTIM: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
20 (1976).
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crime: 'First, by her assailant; and then again by the system.' , And
further still, as one commentator added, "[i]n no other crime is the vic-
tim's word doubted as in a rape case.",
34
B. Relevance
Rule 412 excludes opinion and reputation evidence because of its
unreliability. 35 Rule 412 permits the introduction of evidence of prior
specific instances of sexual activity between the victim and the accused.36
33. Id. at 18 (citations omitted). The victim's relationship with the accused is unnecessa-
rily and unfairly examined in great detail.
If [the defendant] is a former boyfriend, acquaintance, or a bar "pick-up", the jury
tends to condemn the victim as having precipitated the crime or falsely accused her
"lover" after a quarrel. There seems to be a general assumption that "once a woman
consents at a prior time, it is automatically assumed that there is an implied consent
at this time." However, as reported by several studies on rape, rapes of this type are
often reported as the most brutal and physically violent of all reported rapes.
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 8.
35. FED. R. EVID. 412 congressional discussion.
36. Rule 412 further limits the methods of proving consent by restricting even the use of
specific instances of conduct because there are weaknesses with this method of proving con-
sent. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Character evidence of a specific instance of
the victim's consent with the defendant in the past does not necessarily prove she consented to
sexual relations with the defendant at the moment of the alleged rape in question. The exist-
ence of such evidence does not lead to the conclusion that the victim has forfeited her right to
choose her sexual partner in the future.
Many rapes occur between a victim and an assailant who know each other. According to
a study on reported rapes, approximately forty percent of the rapists are known to their vic-
tims. C. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 6. Thus, although there may be reputation or opinion
testimony that the victim and assailant have had prior sexual relations together, it does not
conclude that the victim consented on the particular occasion in question.
Presence of any of the three types of evidence revealing a past relationship-whether as
friends or lovers-between the victim and the defendant does not necessarily prove that the
victim consented to sexual intercourse on the occasion in question. One commentator pointed
out a false assumption:
[I]n cases of rape by friends, it is usually assumed that the victim colludes in her own
victimization. It is frequently suggested that the word "rape" be confined to cases
where the woman is raped by a stranger and that another word be invented for cases
in which the woman is raped by a friend, acquaintance, lover, or husband.
D. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE 87 (1975). Also, interviews with rape victims contradict
the preconceived idea that rape by a friend, lover, or husband is less traumatic than rape by a
stranger. See generally id. at 87-97.
Sexual aggression by husbands has been given much recent attention. According to the
law in a majority of states, "a husband, by definition, cannot rape his wife; that is, forced
sexual intercourse with one's wife is legal." L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS, RAPE AND EVE-
RYDAY LIFE 1 (1983). The notion that a wife consents at the time of marriage is merely a
"legal fiction." Id. It is a fact that many men actually do rape their wives. However, because
of this law in a majority of the states and because of the obvious problems with presenting
evidence of the wife's character trait for consenting in the past, many women are left without
recourse.
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Its refusal to admit reputation and opinion testimony signifies a recogni-
tion in the federal rules that these methods of proving consent in rape
cases are irrelevant and prejudicial in today's society. Evidence of prior
specific instances of-conduct is considered more relevant because it en-
ables the fact finder to evaluate more objectively and more fairly (in com-
parison to problems associated with the evaluation of reputation and
opinion evidence) the probability that consent was given on the particu-
lar occasion in question.
A strong argument can be made in favor of Rule 412's inadmissibil-
ity of reputation and opinion evidence of the victim's previous sexual
conduct in rape cases. Testimony of reputation and opinion is unreliable
and irrelevant given today's society. 7 Due to the expansion of urban
society, neighbors are often less familiar with each other. The concept of
the "community" through which interpersonal relationships are nur-
tured is becoming obsolete, as is the concept of one's "reputation in the
community."
In addition, premarital or nonmarital sex is more commonly ac-
cepted in today's open-minded society. Thus, the question of the rele-
vance of reputation and opinion evidence is an unrealistic condition
precedent to its admission. It is clear that this type of evidence is irrele-
vant in today's society. Thus, it is time that California consider adopting
Rule 412's prohibition against such admission.
C. Prejudice and Confusion of Issues
Another major criticism of the admissibility of this type of evidence
is that it opens the gates to collateral issues which may confuse the jury.
Character evidence naturally reflects moral judgments. One attorney
pointed out the unique problems associated with the jury in prosecuting
rape cases. He stated:
From the prosecutor's point of view, there is no such thing as a
good rape case. I've tried plenty of them over the years and I
have never won more than half of them. It is the most difficult
kind of case to win before a jury. Juries are funny. Usually
they think that if it did happen, the girl was asking for it. You
know, the defense goes into her prior experience, in their mind
that means a girl who gives consent.38
The jury tends to act emotionally and in accordance with its own
values rather than rationally when reputation and opinion testimonial
37. See injia generally section V.
38. C. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 20 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
19851
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evidence is introduced. A member of the New York City's Mayor's Task
Force on Rape concluded:
The issue of "promiscuity" is brought but only to preju-
dice a jury. Our position is that no facts should come out to
prejudice a jury unless they are relevant to the case. For exam-
ple, if a woman is plying her trade as a prostitute, and the de-
fendant says that she promised to do it for $10, and then at the
last minute, when they were in bed, whe [sic] she said she
wouldn't do it for less than $25 . . .and a rape happened in
that context, that would be relevant. But if a "promiscuous"
woman is walking along and gets dragged into the bushes and
raped, her promiscuity is totally irrelevant. No questions about
her earlier sexual experience should be allowed.3 9
As noted by one commentator, it is unfortunate that "many times in
the eyes of the jury, submission by the victim to the rape implies consent
to the act of intercourse."'4
[I]f attacked, [the victim] may be condemned because she sub-
mitted to the act of forcible intercourse rather than fighting to
the death to show her lack of consent to the act. It seems to be
society's viewpoint that a dead rape victim, or one that is se-
verely injured, is much more socially acceptable than one who
has survived the experience emotionally and physically. This,
in itself, places a tremendous emotional burden upon the
victim.
41
The significance and extent of factors generally associated with the
adjudication of rape cases have been evaluated in a survey involving par-
ticipants from a majority of the states.4 2 In the area of rape, prosecutors
were asked what degree of impact they thought the admissibility of evi-
dence concerning the victim's sexual conduct had on the prosecution of
rape cases. A majority of the respondents felt that admission of such
evidence played a major role in jury deliberation.43 The degree of the
impact was significantly reduced when cases were considered by the
court alone rather than by a jury. On the issue of whether the impact of
character evidence was thought to be "considerable," the survey dis-
closed a seventy-four percent impact in a jury trial as compared to a
39. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
40. Id. See also supra note 33.
41. C. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 23.
42. 1 G. CAPLAN, FORCIBLE RAPE-A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE RESPONSE OF PROSE-
CUTORS 25 (1977).
43. Id. at 26-27.
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twenty-two percent impact in a court trial.' Thus, the use of character
evidence promotes distraction of a jury away from the factual determina-
tion of the question of consent on the particular occasion in question.
Other studies indicate that juries tend to scrutinize the victim heart-
lessly and to sympathize with the defendant whenever there is the nar-
rowest representation that the victim's character is anything less than
perfect.45 Thus, rather than basing its determination solely upon the is-
sue of consent at the moment of the alleged rape, the jury instead focuses
upon the victim's sexual history. Regardless of the judge's instructions,
this is the result.46 As a result, the defense is able to hide the material
issues presented by the prosecution behind the shield which evolves from
the admission of prejudicial reputation or opinion testimony.
It is common for a distracted jury to fail to grasp the true issues in a
case. This problem was clearly recognized by the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence:
Character evidence. . . tends to distract the trier of fact from
the main question of what actually happened on the particular
occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually
happened.47
Ironically, the concern for the jury when character evidence is
presented also was revealed by the drafters of the CEC. In stating their
reasons for excluding character evidence in civil cases, the California
drafters explained their concern that the "introduction of character evi-
dence may result in confusion of issues and require collateral inquiry."48
The United States Supreme Court, as well, has recognized these
dangers. In Michelson v. United States,49 the Court stated that "[tihe
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id.
46. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249 (1966).
47. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee note (citing Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Rep.,
Rec. & Studies, 615 (1964)).
See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948) (reputation of defendant con-
victed of bribing a federal officer in issue). In Michelson, the Supreme Court recognized that
instructions to the jury tend to produce the opposite effect of what is desired. The Court
noted, that with character evidence,
once it gets before the jury, and the less they are told about the grounds for its
admission, or what they shall do with it, the more likely they are to use it sensibly.
The subject seems to gather mist which discussion serves only to thicken, and which
we can scarcely hope to dissipate by anything further we can add.
Id. at 474-75 n.5 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
48. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 comment (West 1966).
49. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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overriding policy of excluding [character] evidence. . . is the practical
experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, un-
fair surprise and undue prejudice."5
Thus, it is clear that evidence of a victim's prior sexual behavior
often will assume disproportionate importance in the proceedings and
will distract a jury's attention from the relevant proof of the crime." In
Michelson, the Court recognized that character evidence tends to shift
the focus of the proceeding,52 placing the victim rather than the defend-
ant on trial. It stated that character evidence "is said to weigh too much
with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a par-
ticular charge." 3 James E. Hendricks, of the Criminal Justice Depart-
ment warned: "We must realize that the rapist is engaged in criminal
behavior, not the victim."54
Some defense lawyers consciously try to prejudice jurors against the
rape victim in the hope of increasing the accused's chances of acquittal.
For example, one defense attorney stated to a judge: "I think her extra-
curricular activities are a very important bit of evidence. Her reputation
has a great deal of bearing on this case.""5 By encouraging the jury to try
the victim rather than the defendant, defense attorneys are "bootlegging
• . . the tort concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
into the criminal law."56
V. RELEVANCE OF REPUTATION AND OPINION EVIDENCE IN
TODAY'S SOCIETY
A. Expanding Urban Society
Section 1103 of the CEC fails to reflect the social norms present in
today's society. Also, it ignores the basic principle of relevance which is
recognized for every other type of evidence.
50. Id. at 476 (footnote omitted).
51. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 250-54. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 268
Ind. 127, 373 N.E.2d 1103 (1978). In Roberts, the defendant allegedly kidnapped and raped a
woman, abandoned her infant beside the road in subfreezing weather and left the victim locked
in the trunk of her car. This defendant attempted to distract the focal point of the proceedings
in the eyes of the jury by seeking to prove consent to the rape. Id. at 130, 373 N.E.2d at 1106.
52. 335 U.S. at 476.
53. Id.
54. Hendricks, Criminal Justice Intervention With the Rape Victim, I 1 J. POLICE SCi. &
AD. 255 (1983).
55. Id.
56. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 46, at 243.
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In Michelson v. United States,57 the defendant called five witnesses
to prove that he had a good reputation in his community. Defendant
Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent. The govern-
ment proved that Michelson made a large payment to this agent in an
attempt to influence his official action. Michelson, acting as his own wit-
ness, admitted having made the payment. However, he added that he did
so in response to the agent's demands, threats, solicitations, and induce-
ments which amounted to entrapment. Resolution of the issue turned on
whether the jury believed the agent or the accused.
In Michelson, the Supreme Court engaged in a discussion of reputa-
tion evidence-its purpose, its relevance, and its problems. 8 The Mich-
elson Court recognized that "[s]erious and responsible criticism has been
aimed . . . at common-law doctrine on the whole subject of proof of
reputation or character."59 The Michelson Court admitted that reputa-
tion testimony "at its best opens a tricky line of inquiry as to a shapeless
and elusive subject matter. At its worst it opens a veritable Pandora's
box of irresponsible gossip, innuendo and smear. '
The Supreme Court in Michelson examined the history of the useful-
ness and relevance of reputation testimony in our society. It stated:
In the frontier phase of our law's development, calling friends
to vouch for defendant's good character, and its counterpart-
calling the rivals and enemies of a witness to impeach him by
testifying that his reputation for veracity was so bad that he
was unworthy of belief on his oath-were favorite and frequent
ways of converting an individual litigation into a community
contest and a trial into a spectacle. Growth of urban condi-
tions, where one may never know or hear the name of his
nextdoor neighbor, have tended to limit the use of these tech-
niques and to deprive them of weight with juries.6 1
Keep in mind that Michelson was decided in 1948. Since that time,
57. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
58. The Michelson Court stated that
[t]he evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant but
only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. This has been well
described in a different connection as "the slow growth of months and years, the
resultant picture of forgotten incidents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct,
presumably honest because disinterested, and safer to be trusted because prone to
suspect. . . . It is for that reason that such general repute is permitted to be
proven."
Id. at 477 (citation omitted).
59. 335 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 480.
61. Id.
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there has been extensive urban growth throughout this country, sug-
gesting that the Court's earlier interpretations have become even more
appropriate in today's society where it is not uncommon to find that
neighbors are often strangers. Thus, the concept of reputation and opin-
ion evidence has become elusive and virtually obsolete.
. Nonmarital Intercourse
Nonmarital. intercourse has become more accepted in today's soci-
ety. Studies taken over a period of thirty years indicate that many young
women engage in premarital sexual relationships. 2 With this change in
societal behavior and attitudes, testimony as to the reputation and opin-
ion of a witness regarding a victim's sexual conduct becomes irrelevant.
The California Legislature ignores the notion that "character" is de-
fined as the degree of conformity to the prevailing customs or standards
of the culture at a particular time. Research findings reflect increasing
premarital and extramarital sexual activity among women in America.
6 3
One study indicates that this probably encompasses the majority of
American women.6 It necessarily follows that the number of rape vic-
tims who may be subjected to trauma and humiliation at trial due to
presentation of such evidence is also increasing.
Traditional beliefs about the sexual attitudes and practices of Amer-
ican women began to vanish with the publication of the famous Kinsey
Report .6  This report indicates that fifty percent of the women inter-
viewees who were married before the age of twenty had engaged in pre-
marital sex.6 6 The same was true for those married women between the
ages of twenty-one and twenty-five 7.6  Among the married women be-
tween the ages of twenty-six and thirty, approximately forty percent to
sixty-six percent had engaged in premarital sex.68
Section 1103 is based on the moral judgment that women who en-
gage in nonmarital intercourse are immoral and, therefore, are more
likely to consent to intercourse. 9 Once this immorality is established,
62. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. BEGHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter cited as A. KINSEY]. See also R. SORENSON, ADO-
LESCENT SEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 121-22 (1973) (45% of females aged 13-
19 had experienced intercourse).
63. See M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 149-55 (1974).
64. See Ardover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented
Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 99-102 (1977).
65. A. KINSEY, supra note 62.
66. Id. at 287.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 40-41.
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the fact finder may infer consent from the presentation of reputation or
opinion evidence concerning the victim's "unchastity." Section 1103 al-
lows juries to speculate about consent on the basis of inferences which
recent statistics indicate are no longer relevant in today's society.
C. Discouragement of Victims to Seek Prosecution
A push for new federal and state regulation in the rape area was
prompted by an uneasy feeling in society that in rape cases there was too
much indiscriminate cross-examination and evidence regarding the sex-
ual behavior of the victim. Defense attorneys strategically use character
evidence to shift the jury's focus. Victims feel as though they, rather
than the defendants, are the ones on trial. As pointed out by a commen-
tator, "rape is a unique crime in that legal and social pressures oftentimes
condemn the victim, rather than focusing the blame where it actually
belongs."70 These courtroom attacks on victims, together with the severe
effect on their psyches and senses of privacy, apparantly discourage them
from reporting the crime, testifying at trial, or cooperating with the po-
lice and the prosecutor. According to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, forcible rape "is one of the most under-reported crimes due
primarily to fear and/or embarassment on the part of the victim."'"
70. C. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 23.
71. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 15 (1973).
Police and courts view immediate notification of a rape as an indication that a crime
actually occurred. In a study on rape, it was found that "police and society tend to give more
credence to a victim who conforms to the following provisions: 'if she reports the crime imme-
diately, if she can provide evidence of the attack and of her active resistence.'" C. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 32, at 6 (citations omitted).
However, for various reasons, victimized women usually are hesitant to report a rape
directly to the police immediately after its occurrence. Id. The Women Organized Against
Rape (WOAR) and other rape crisis centers stated several reasons:
One is that the crime of rape bears a stigma of shame and humiliation for the
victim. Women are brought up in the belief that rape only happens to "bad girls"
and thus, after being raped, they question their own attitudes, beliefs, and sexual
fantasies, diverting the blame for the crime from the offender to themselves. They
have also heard and accepted the common ditties about rape which "prove" its im-
possibility, and they are conditioned to believe that rape is only an hysterical outcry
from an emotionally disturbed woman, and has no real basis. Therefore, when they
are raped they suffer an even deeper emotional shock.
Many women have heard unflattering reports of police conduct in the question-
ing of a rape victim, and they only want to forget what has happened to them instead
of repeating the details to curious men. Many women's first instinct after being
raped is to cleanse themselves of touch and scent of their assaulter, and thereby de-
stroying evidence of the attack. Other women, particularly those who have been
raped by an acquaintance and who not [sic] virgins at the time of the attack, rational-
ize that physically there was no harm done and that the police will be reluctant to
pursue the offender and so the crime is never reported.
"One past victim. . . remarked that a woman must be bruised, bloody, and
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As a common strategy, the accused merely claims that the inter-
course was consensual. Thus, the victim, having been put on trial, can
then be attacked with evidence of her general reputation within the com-
munity. A defendant could very likely evade a rape conviction by em-
phasizing the victim's sexual history introduced during the trial. There
is significant potential for a guilty man to avoid a rape conviction due to
false reputation or opinion testimony of a vindictive ex-lover or
blackmailer.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Constitutional Rights
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles a
defendant to the right to confront and to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. This amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."72 This right is also guaranteed by section 686 of
the California Penal Code.
73
The right to confront adverse witnesses is fundamental to the right
damned near dead in order for the crime to be considered not consensual." Other
rapists may threaten their victim with further harm if a report is made to the police.
All of these reasons cause rape to be the most underreported crime in this coun-
try. Estimates go as high as only one rape in ten being reported to the police.
C. GOLDSTIN, supra note 32, at 6-7 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
72. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
In criminal cases, the accused is entitled to use character evidence in presenting his de-
fense. The interests of the accused must be protected because of the serious penalties that may
arise, i.e., life imprisonment.
The gravity of a criminal conviction, involving the possible loss of life or liberty, has
influenced all courts to give special dispensation to an accused: he is permitted to
show character traits (e.g., honesty, peacefulness) inconsistent with the crime
charged. The dangers of prejudice to the accused do not exist with respect to evi-
dence of a relevant trait of "good" character offered by the accused, although the
potential costs to the trial process of increased time consumption and distraction are
present. The courts, however, consider paramount the accused's interest in protect-
ing his freedom and hence they subordinate the counterveiling practical
considerations.
G. LILLY, supra note 2, at 109-10 (footnote and citations omitted). For additional comments
on the use of character evidence in rape trials, see supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
Fourteenth amendment due process also grants the criminal defendant access to the pros-
ecution's evidence. In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), the defendants were convicted of
rape and given death sentences which were later changed to life imprisonment. They claimed
that they were denied due process of law by the prosecution's suppression of evidence
favorable to them and by knowing use of perjured testimony. Id. at 67-68.
73. People v. Foster, 67 Cal. 2d 604, 606, 432 P.2d 976, 977, 63 Cal. Rptr. 288, 289
(1967) (en banc); CAL. PEN. CODE § 686 (West Supp. 1984). Section 686 provides in pertinent
part:
In a criminal action the defendant is entitled:
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to a fair trial. However, it is not absolute. In Chambers v. Mississippi,74
the Supreme Court pointed out that other legitimate interests in the trial
process must be considered. 75 The Chambers Court suggested a balanc-
ing test to weigh these conflicting interests.76 It recognized that "[t]he
right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial proce-
dure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps
assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process.' ,77 However, it
warned that "the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute
and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accomodate other legitimate inter-
ests in the criminal trial process."7 "
B. California Case Law
In Pointer v. Texas,79 the Supreme Court extended the sixth amend-
ment's confrontation clause to state criminal proceedings through the
3. To produce witnesses on his behalf and to be confronted with the witness
against him, in the presence of the court, except that:
(a) Hearsay evidence may be admitted to the extent that it is otherwise admis-
sible in a criminal action under the law of this state.
(b) The deposition of a witness taken in the action may be read to the extent
that it is otherwise admissible under the law of this state.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 686 (West Supp. 1984).
74. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
75. Id. at 295.
76. Id. The petitioner, Chambers, was tried by a jury and convicted of murdering a police
officer. The jury assessed punishment of life in prison. McDonald, a witness, orally admitted
to the murder on three separate occasions, each time to a different friend. Following Cham-
bers' arrest, McDonald made, but later repudiated, a written confession. Id. at 285-88. Cham-
bers claimed his due process rights had been violated because he was not allowed to cross-
examine McDonald or to introduce the testimony of the three people to whom McDonald had
confessed. Chambers filed a pretrial motion requesting the court to order McDonald's appear-
ance. Id. at 291. He also sought a ruling that would allow him to call McDonald as an
adverse witness in case the state itself chose not to do so. Id. Upon conclusion of the state's
cross-examination, Chambers renewed his motion to examine McDonald. Id. The trial court
denied these requests. Id. These denials were the result of the trial court's strict application of
certain Mississippi rules of evidence. Id. at 289. Thus, at trial, Chambers was not permitted
either to cross-examine McDonald or to present his own witnesses who would have discredited
McDonald's reputation regarding the prior confession. Id. at 294. The Court held that the
state rule violated Chamber's constitutional right to confrontation. Id. at 296-297.
77. Id. at 295 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In Pointer, the defendant was arrested in Texas and brought
before a state judge for a preliminary hearing on a charge of having robbed a man named
Phillips. Pointer was not represented by counsel. He did not choose to cross-examine Phillips
at that time. Before the trial took place, Phillips moved to California. At the trial, the state
offered the transcript of Phillips' testimony given at the preliminary hearing as evidence
against Pointer. Pointer's counsel at trial unsuccessfully objected to introduction of the tran-
script claiming that it denied the defendant the right to confront the witness. Pointer was
subsequently convicted. Id. at 401-02.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." In People v. Flores,81
a California Court of Appeal noted that a full cross-examination is a
matter of absolute right and not of privilege.82
It is clear that a defendant has a constitutional right to due process;
otherwise, an innocent defendant could suffer loss of life or liberty un-
justly.83 However, the risk of prejudice to the rape victim in the court's
admission of reputation or opinion testimony is significant. Evidence of
reputation and opinion is arguably entirely irrelevant in today's society. 4
It appears that the California courts have begun to recognize this
problem.
For example, in People v. Blackburn,8" a 1976 case, a defendant con-
tended that section 1103, which at that time precluded him from intro-
ducing evidence of a rape victim's sexual conduct with other men in
order to prove her consent to sexual intercourse with him, deprived him
of his due process rights to confront witnesses against him and to a fair
trial.8 6 The California Court of Appeal rejected these contentions.8 7
The Blackburn court held that section 1103 did not deprive the de-
fendant of a fair trial for two reasons. First, the due process right to a
fair trial does not require that all relevant evidence that may tend to
exonerate a defendant be admissible."8 And second, evidence concerning
a victim's sexual conduct with other men has slight relevance to prove
that the victim consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant.8 9
In People v. Belmontes,90 a 1983 decision, the California Supreme
Court held that section 1103, as amended in 1981, precludes the admis-
sion of character evidence not only in prosecutions involving rape, but in
80. Id. at 406.
81. 15 Cal. App. 2d 385, 59 P.2d 517 (2d Dist. 1936). In Flores, a woman provided evi-
dence showing that she had been physically forced into an alley by 12 men and then brutally
raped by nine of them. Id. at 388-89, 59 P.2d at 518-19. However, after examining the record,
the court stated that "when the evidence is 'in such sharp conflict' as is the evidence in this
case, and that when the evidence is such as appears to be incredible, that the rulings and
instructions of the court become of grave consequence." Id. at 401, 50 P.2d at 525-26 (empha-
sis in original) (quoting People v. Jones, 160 Cal. 358, 363, 117 P. 176, 177 (1911)). Thus, the
court in Flores ieasoned that "on a record such as this 'the utmost latitude compatible with our
rules of evidence should have been permitted in the cross-examination of. . . a witness."' 15
Cal. App. 2d at 401, 59 P.2d at 526 (citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. See supra note 72. But see also infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
84. See supra generally section V.
85. 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (2d Dist. 1976).
86. Id. at 689, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
87. Id. at 691, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
88. Id., 128 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
89. Id. at 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 866-67.
90. 34 Cal. 3d 335, 667 P.2d 686, 193 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1983).
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prosecutions involving oral copulation and sodomy as well.91 In
Belmontes, a case involving kidnapping, rape, oral copulation and sod-
omy, the defendant attempted to assert evidence that his brother had
sexual intercourse with the victim at least six times in the past few
months. He asserted its relevance to show consent to the oral copulation
and sodomy charges. The court found it irrelevant to the issue of
consent.92
It appears that the California Legislature, through the 1974 amend-
ment to section 1103, and the California courts, through case law, have
recognized that the rape victim's sexual conduct with those other than
the defendant is irrelevant when the issue of consent has been raised.
However, the question remains whether the California Legislature and
courts will extend the rationale to preclude opinion and reputation evi-
dence of the victim's past sexual conduct even with the defendant.93 The
California Legislature needs to strike a balance between the accused's
right to confront and adequately cross-examine the state's witnesses and
the likelihood of prejudice to the victim and of confusion of the issues. It
can be so by adopting the provisions of Rule 412 of the FRE.
C. Constitutionality of Rule 412
Unlike most of the other federal rules, Rule 412 specifically refers to
the United States Constitution. It allows the introduction of evidence of
the victim's past sexual activities when "constitutionally required to be
admitted.19 4 It is clear that this provision was established in the event of
a due process or confrontation clause challenge.95 Congress must have
recognized the potential for constitutional scrutiny of the statute.
This constitutional provision is necessary in light of the fact that all
reputation and opinion evidence is excluded under Rule 412. Without
this provision, a defendant who claims he has never had prior sexual
relations with the victim would be completely barred from revealing im-
plications of the victim's consent.
Thus, Rule 412 is a constitutional protection which strikes a com-
promise between the rights of the victim and those of the accused. The
victim is protected against potential humiliation and trauma by the pro-
hibition of arguably irrelevant reputation and opinion testimony. How-
91. Id. at 341, 667 P.2d at 668-69, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85 (citing People v. Blackburn, 56
Cal. App. 3d 685, 690, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (2d Dist. 1976)).
92. Id. at 341, 667 P.2d at 688, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
93. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
94. FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1).
95. FED. R. EVID. 412 congressional discussion.
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ever, there is still an element of uncertainty. Rule 412 is not equipped
with clear advance notice of the extent to which the victim's private life
may be questioned if she decides to testify at trial.
Under Rule 412, there is a right to introduce evidence to prove a
defense, balanced with certain restrictions. These restrictions are based
upon considerations of extrinsic social policy, such as the functioning of
the criminal justice system and the protection of the witness' privacy.
Rule 412 limits the available methods of proving consent to specific in-
stances of sexual conduct with the accused. However, whenever the evi-
dence is "constitutionally required," the Constitution prevails to make it
admissible. Thus, Rule 412 specifically and expressly provides the de-
fendant constitutional protection in the case of highly probative evidence
of sexual conduct.
VII. STATE INTEREST IN PROMOTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
It is a common misperception that rape is a crime of sexual gratifica-
tion. Studies indicate that a female does not contribute to the perpetra-
tion of rape merely by her appearance or actions.96 There is a growing
acknowledgement that rape is "a very ugly. . . crime of violence moti-
vated by hostility and rage, not sexual passion."
97
Rape is an act of violence which subjects the victim not only to pain,
but to emotional humiliation, as well. When a woman decides to prose-
cute her assailant, she must be prepared to discuss her story with the
police, the hospital, and the courts, and to face the skepticism of both
society and the courts. One commentator remarked that a woman might
be better off not prosecuting the crime. He states:
One of the great injustices that the victims of criminal rape
must suffer is the necessity of reliving the experience in minute
detail over and over again from the first complaint to the police
to the last phase of the trial. By attempting to prosecute the
man who has raped her, a woman disassociates herself from the
crime and endeavors to reconstitute her self-esteem, but it is a
rare woman who is so independent of the evaluation of others
that she can survive the contemptuous publicity that her at-
tempt will draw upon her . . . . The odds against her suc-
ceeding in her prosecution, even after the police have
96. See M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 74, 96 (1971). Amir accumulated his
data from a study of 646 rape cases in Philadelphia. He found that rapists select their victims
with a degree of randomness. Thus, his study rebutted the theory of victim.precipitated rape.
Id. at 257.
97. O'Connor, Texas Sex Laws, THE TExAs OBSERVER, Dec. 15, 1978.
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reluctantly agreed to charge her assailant, are rather worse
than four to one. If a woman's only concern is for herself and
her eventual recovery from the experience, then she is much
better advised not to prosecute. 98
Reactions from a victim's family, friends and community are serious
and difficult enough to encounter without imposing a fear of harassment
on the stand, as well. As reported by the United States Department of
Justice:
Psychological and emotional trauma follow a rape. Left
untreated, the repercussions can be far more damaging to the
victim in the long run than the physical assault itself. The
trauma that all victims endure varies in degree. Symptoms may
include insomnia, anxiety, depression, fear of being alone and/
or fear of men.
The reactions of family, friends and community to rape,
particularly if the crime is publicized, may be confused and
negative in their impact. The family reaction to children who
have been raped is often extremely emotional, and may be man-
ifested in a variety of responses which are disruptive to the life-
style of the entire family. Adult members of the family often
lose sleep, and react with insecure feelings about reoccurring
acts of violence. The initial response may be a need to blame
either the child, the assailant, or the parents themselves. Fol-
lowing these reactions is the long-term process of reorganizing
their children's lives, as well as their own. Rape will also cause
a family to have to deal with the issue of sexuality, and the
parents may feel thrust into situations they feel unable to han-
dle. Often professional counseling is an appropriate way to re-
solve these conflicts. Community reaction is changing as public
agencies, rape crisis centers and women's rights groups educate
the public about rape; however, a long social history perpetu-
ates attitudes that change slowly.99
98. C. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 18 (citations omitted).
Obviously, for the rape victim, the trial can be a degrading and humiliating experi-
ence. She may be viewed with disbelief, and is often ridiculed and denigrated by
lawyers, judges and juries. After going through this humiliating experience, her as-
sailant is more often than not set free to resume his life, while she may take months
to recover from both the rape and the assault on her character in the courtroom.
Id. at 21. California Dep't of Justice, Information Pamphlet No. 12, Rape: The Crime and Its
Prevention 12 (1979).
99. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIME PREVENTION UNIT, CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION PAMPHLET No. 12, RAPE: THE CRIME AND ITS PREVEN-
TION 12 (1979).
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"Although it is true that an innocent man may be falsely charged with
rape, both the incidence of this happening and the results are far different
than the public believes. Statistics citing cases of falsely reported rape
range from ten to fifteen percent." 1" An assistant district attorney
claimed that "those women who falsely claim rape seldom go any further
in the judicial process than making a complaint to the police." 10 1
While there is reason to protect the innocent man accused of rape,
one must remember that rape is frequently not reported. 10 2 In a study of
rape victims conducted by Medea and Thompson, it was found that "70
percent of the victims never even reported the crime. Of the cases re-
ported, only 33 percent of the rapists were apprehended. And of the
rapists caught, 50 percent were convicted of the crime. This was a grand
total of three convictions out of sixty rapes." 103
The increasing incidence of rape and the widespread reluctance of
rape victims to report the crime has led to a reevaluation of the treatment
of the victim and the accused by the criminal justice system. The law
recognizes rape as one of the most serious crimes known. As a state
interested in the promotion of criminal justice, California should adopt
Rule 412's provisions for the protection of the increasing number of rape
victims.
VIII. DIsCUSSION OF CALIFORNIA'S RELUCTANCE TO ADOPT RULE
412
As far back as 1856, California has exhibited a desire to adopt a rule
similar to Rule 412 of the FRE, but has been reluctant to do so. In
People v. Benson,"° an 1856 case, the defendant was indicted for the rape
of a thirteen year old girl. The victim was the prosecution's sole witness.
At trial, the defendant in Benson introduced evidence of the victim's
reputation for unchastity.105 On appeal, the California Supreme Court
stated: "I cannot understand why, upon any sound rule, general reputa-
tion should be preferred to particular facts. . . . It appears to me that
proof of particular acts of lewdness should be admitted in preference to
general reputation, which may be good or bad, either deservedly or unde-
servedly."1 0 6 Thus, as early as 1856, the court recognized the adverse
100. C. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 9 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. 6 Cal. 221 (1856).
105. The defendant also attempted to introduce evidence of specific past sexual conduct of
the victim. This evidence was excluded. Id. at 222.
106. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
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effects of reliance upon reputation testimony and expressed a preference
for evidence of specific acts.
In People v. Guthreau, °7 a California Court of Appeal affirmed a
conviction by a jury of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation. As to
the rape charge, the accused raised the defense that the victim had con-
sented. The court in Guthreau held that the trial court's refusal to allow
inquiry into the victim's prior sexual conduct was proper under section
1103. 18 It stated: "'The relevance of past sexual conduct of the alleged
victim of the rape with persons other than the defendant to the issue of
her consent to a particular act of sexual intercourse with the defendant is
slight at best.' "109
It can be inferred from these statements that the California courts
have acknowledged to some extent the rationale behind the provisions of
Rule 412, which permits only evidence of specific instances of conduct
between the victim and the particular defendant on trial. It is ironic that
California's legislature, considering its liberal views in many other areas
of law, has been so reluctant to adopt the provisions of Rule 412.
IX. CONCLUSION
Acceptance of the notion that reputation and opinion testimony
concerning a victim's past sexual conduct is irrelevant to the issue of
consent may be difficult for California's court system and legislature.
Nevertheless, a reevaluation of California's attitudes toward the crime of
rape is imperative. The incidence of the crime of rape is increasing at an
alarming rate.
Reputation and opinion testimony regarding the victim's unchastity
should not be admitted because of its remoteness to the issue of consent.
It also increases the dangers of jury confusion and prejudice. These types
of evidence do not establish the fact of unchastity. They merely allow
the fact finder to draw irrelevant inferences which are significantly
prejudical to the rape victim.
Admissibility of these types of testimony subtly undermines the ad-
versary system. The purpose of this system is to settle disputes by dis-
covering the facts of the particular incident in question. Its purpose is
not to make a moral judgment following an examination of the parties'
history of sexual relations.
107. 102 Cal. App. 3d 436, 162 Cal. Rptr. 376 (4th Dist. 1980).
108. Id. at 444, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
109. Id., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 380 (quoting People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690, 128
Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (2d Dist. 1976)).
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Facts concerning a woman's previous sexual conduct are not auto-
matically relevant to the present issue of consent. Today, our society is a
mobile and urban one. Thus, the probative value of a female's reputation
within a "community" is minimal and most likely will be outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. Reputation and opinion evidence of the victim's
prior sexual activity, when offered to prove consent, should be excluded
as inherently unreliable.
An indication of the California judicial system's bias against the
rape victim is apparant by its allowance of reputation and opinion testi-
mony, which puts the victim rather than the accused on trial. The time
has come to reject the automatic assumption that "unchastity"-the defi-
nition of which depends on the individual trier of fact-is relevant to the
issue of consent and to minimize the trauma at trial for rape victims.
The enactment of Rule 412 represents a legislative attempt to bal-
ance the conflicting rights of the rape victim and the accused. This bal-
ance is accomplished by the narrow limits imposed on the admissibility
of evidence of prior sexual conduct to prove consent and the broad scope
of admissibility of such evidence "when constitutionally required."
Rule 412 is a natural response to the changing needs and demands
of our society. It is time that California adopt its provisions in accord-
ance with our changing society.
Leslie M, McConnell
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